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ABSTRACT 
Exploring Sources of Local Government Technical Inefficiency:  
Evidence from Flemish Municipalities   
by Benny Geys and Wim Moesen 
The present paper explores sources of technical (in)efficiency of Flemish 
municipalities in their production of local public goods (in the year 2000).  In 
assessing inefficiency derivation, we focus on socio-economic and political 
characteristics of the municipalities as potential source.  Our main findings 
indicate that while the socio-economic make-up of the population (i.c. income, 
income inequality, education and unemployment) appears to bear little relation 
to local (in)efficiency, the reverse holds for the municipal financial situation (i.c. 
grants, historical debt and fiscal surplus) as well as population size and density.  
Also, different types of communities – i.e. agricultural, residential, industrial, 
touristic or urbanised – are generally found to achieve comparable performance 
levels in providing ‘core’ public services.  While indicative, the limitations of our 
dataset imply that further work is vital before definitive conclusions (as well as 
causal inferences) can be made. 
 
Keywords: Technical efficiency, government performance, Socio-economic typology, 
Flemish municipalities 
JEL Classification: H11, H72, H21 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Ursachenforschung zur technischen Ineffizienz kommunaler 
Verwaltungen: Evidenz von flämischen Gemeindeverwaltungen 
Im vorliegenden Papier untersuchen wir anhand flämischer Gemeindeverwal-
tungen im Jahr 2002 die Ursachen von technischer Effizienz bzw. Ineffizienz in 
der Bereitstellung von lokalen öffentlichen Gütern. Als mögliche Quellen von 
Ineffizienz fokussieren wir in unserer Analyse auf sozioökonomische und politi-
sche Charakteristika der jeweiligen Gemeinden. Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen, 
dass die finanzielle Situation und die Einwohnerzahl und -dichte der Gemeinden 
(d.h. Subventionen, Altschuldenlasten, Haushaltsüberschüsse etc.) im Zusam-
menhang mit kommunaler (In)Effizienz stehen, während hingegen die Struktur 
der Bevölkerung in Hinblick auf sozioökonomische Charakteristika (z.B. 
Einkommen und deren Verteilung, Bildung und Arbeitslosigkeit) kaum einen 
Einfluss hat. Ebenso zeigen verschiedene Gemeindetypen (wir unterscheiden 
hier z.B. nach landwirtschaftlichen Gemeinden, Wohngegenden, Industrie-
gebieten, touristisch erschlossenen und urbanisierten Gemeinden) ein ver-
gleichbares Niveau in der Bereitstellung der wichtigsten öffentlichen Güter. Die 
Begrenztheit unserer Daten impliziert aber die Notwendigkeit weiterer Analysen 
bevor eindeutige Kausalitäten und Ergebnisse bestimmt werden können. Die 
vorliegende Arbeit bietet hierfür ein Beispiel und zeigt, wie eine solche 
Untersuchung gestaltet werden kann.   1
Introduction 
Although economic efficiency is only one among many public concerns (besides 
effectiveness, equity, responsiveness, adequateness, appropriateness, and so on; Dunn, 
2004, 223-231), it has received increasing amounts of attention in recent years.  One 
illustrative example concerns the performance evaluations central to the New Public 
Management (NPM) discussions since the late 1980s (Lindblad, 2006).  Given this 
increased interest in and awareness of efficiency, there arises also a need to measure it 
and develop an understanding concerning the factors that affect (or influence) it.  The 
present paper takes one step to address the latter question by analysing the variation of 
overall local government performance (via efficiency scores) across the Flemish 
municipalities in the year 2000.  
 
Clearly, we are not the first to analyse local government efficiency.
1  The topic remains, 
however, of significant interest.  For instance, in many countries there have been 
increased discussions concerning a further decentralisation of tasks from higher-level 
governments to the municipal level.  However, while sub-national autonomy might well 
increase allocative efficiency (i.e. smaller jurisdictions with more homogeneous 
populations are often argued to be more capable of matching the provision of public 
goods with the preferences of their constituents; Musgrave 1959; Oates 1972, 1999; 
Tullock, 1969), theory is more prudent as regards its effect in terms of productive 
efficiency (which is the central topic of the present paper).  In fact, a small scale of 
operation may be economically unviable due to, say, a lack of fiscal basis, the inability 
to exploit economies of scale or the absence of sufficient managerial competencies and 
experience among local staff.  Hence, decentralisation should only be advocated when 
local governments are more  (productively) efficient than higher-level governments.   
Second, and more specific to the Belgian setting, local governments have been 
confronted with increasing costs and decreasing revenues over the past decade (see 
section 2.1 for details).  Both elements add pressure to local government’s financial 
situation and, as raising revenues through taxation can be politically costly (e.g. 
Niskanen, 1979; Vermeir and Heyndels, 2006; Geys and Vermeir, 2008), increase the 
need for a more productive (or efficient) use of the available resources.  Given these 
changing circumstances, a new look at local government performance and its 
determinants appears appropriate, if not overdue. 
 
The empirical analysis explores the determinants of local government technical 
efficiency using data from 300 Flemish municipalities in the year 2000.  While a wide 
range of socio-economic and political characteristics is incorporated, our focus lies on 
the relationship between the socio-economic typology of municipalities (i.e. 
agricultural, residential, industrial, touristic or urbanised) and their level of efficiency.  
This follows the suggestion made in Sampaio De Sousa and Stosic (2005, 177) that the 
“low efficiency score of some small [Brazilian] municipalities can be explained by the 
fact that they engage in tourism”.  Our results cannot confirm their proposition.   
Although tourist municipalities are indeed somewhat less efficient, the socio-economic 
typology of a municipality is generally not significantly related to the efficiency with 
                                                 
1   Previous studies include Vanden Eeckaut et al. (1993), De Borger et al. (1994), De Borger and 
Kerstens, (1996), Sampaio De Sousa and Stosic (2005), Hindriks and Gerard (2005), Geys et al. 
(2008).   2
which this municipality provides its ‘core’ public services.
2  I n  l i n e  w ith previous 
research, our results confirm that the municipal population’s income, income inequality, 
education, home-ownership and unemployment level are not related to municipal 
efficiency, while population size and density as well as the municipal financial situation 
(in terms of grant revenues and historical levels of debt) show a strong correlation with 
efficiency. 
 
Section 1 introduces the methodological background for the measurement of 
government efficiency. Section 2 first presents the institutional context and dataset (i.e. 
Flemish municipalities in the year 2000), and then discusses our main findings.  Section 
3 concludes. 
 
1. Measuring Government Efficiency: Methodology 
Though different approaches to measure organisations’ efficiency exist (for an 
overview, see Lovell, 1993), all entail two essential steps.  First, a ‘best practice 
frontier’ is established connecting the input-output combinations where inputs are most 
productively used.  Then, in a second step, deviations from this frontier are employed to 
determine the extent of (in)efficiency of input-output combinations not on this best 
practice frontier.  Early contributions build on non-parametric approaches to construct 
the best practice frontier – i.e. Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and Free Disposal 
Hull (FDH) (e.g. Farrell, 1957; Deprins et al., 1984; Tulkens, 1993) – and designate all 
deviations from the frontier as inefficiency.  As such deviations may also derive from, 
say, measurement errors or other stochastic influences, this may be inappropriate.   
Parametric approaches to efficiency measurement – developed by Aigner et al. (1977) 
and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977) – do not suffer from this downside.  They 
allow for a distinction between the effects of measurement error and inefficiency by 
introducing a composed error term in the parametric frontier equation.  Dropping 
organisation subscripts for convenience, such a statistical model looks like: 
 










r r 11 1 ln ln 2
1 ln    (1) 
where C designates the input indicator, y indicates the various output indicators, s points 
to the number of outputs used and βr and λ rq are parameters to be estimated.  The 
composed error term (ε) consists of a symmetric component (v; assumed to be white 
noise) and a one-sided non-negative component (u) that represents inefficiency (such 
that ε = v + u).  The latter component is generally assumed to have a half-normal or 
truncated normal distribution (cfr. De Borger and Kerstens, 1996; Méon and Weill, 
2005) and to be independent from the former component.  While estimation of equation 
(1) provides values for the composed error term (v + u), Jondrow et al. (1982) and 
Bauer (1983) show that, for any organisation i, the conditional distribution of ui given 
(vi + ui) contains all available information about ui. Hence, this information can be used 
                                                 
2    ‘Core’ public services refer to the provision of certain social, educational, infrastructure, 
environmental and recreational public goods Flemish municipalities are required – by federal and 
regional legislation – to provide.  Municipal governments have to take up these tasks, while they can 
choose to engage in additional tasks such as, say, tourism (see also section 2.1 below).   3
to generate point estimates for the inefficiency component of any given decision-
making unit i (see Jondrow et al., 1982; Bauer, 1983).
3   
 
One downside of equation (1) is that all municipalities are treated on the same footing. 
However, certain characteristics of a municipality may affect how successful the local 
government is in carrying out its tasks, even though it cannot affect these elements in 
the short (or even long) run (Battese and Coelli, 1995; Stevens, 2004).  On obvious 
example of such exogenous (or non-discretionary) influences is the impact of 
geographic context.  A municipality in a hilly region is likely to spend more on a given 
level of road infrastructure, but should therefore not be deemed less efficient in carrying 
out this task. Disregarding the effect of such background factors leads to an 
overestimation of government inefficiency.  Fortunately, they can be taken into account 
by assuming that the inefficiency term (u) in the error of equation (1) is a function of a 
set of background variables (cf. Battese and Coelli, 1995).  In other words, and as 
discussed in Coelli (1996, 7), u is “assumed to be independently distributed as 
truncations at zero of the N(mit, 
2
u σ ) distribution where mit = δ zit”. In this extension, zit 
is a vector of background variables (for municipality i and time period t) which are 
expected to influence (in)efficiency and δ  is a vector of parameters estimating how the 
included background characteristics affect the jurisdiction’s efficiency rating (for 
applications of this approach, see, e.g., Latruffe et al., 2004; Faria et al., 2005; Geys et 
al., 2008).
4  Hence, we come to the following modified model: 
 






r r + + + ∑ ∑ ∑ == = 11 1 ln ln 2
1 ln λ β  (2) 
         w z u
I
i i i + + = ∑ =1δ γ  (3) 
 
where the error term of equation (3), w, is defined by the truncation of the normal 
distribution with zero mean and variance 
2 σ  (Battese and Coelli, 1995). The latter 
assumption assures that the inefficiency component u can only take values bigger than 
or equal to zero.
5  
 
                                                 
3    Constructing the best practice frontier based on the decision-making units at hand implies that 
ensuing efficiency measures are relative rather than absolute, and only have meaning in the specific 
sample employed.  
4   Assessing the impact of non-discretionary factors on efficiency is also possible through a two-stage 
approach (i.e. deriving efficiency estimates from equation (1) and using these as the dependent 
variable in a second regression with the variables in the zi vector as explanatory variables).  Though 
well-established (see, e.g., Pitt and Lee, 1981; De Borger et al., 1994; Worthington, 1999), this 
approach may be inappropriate.  The reason is that the measurement of efficiency in the first step 
assumes that the efficiency term in equation (1) is iid.  However, recovering significant effects of 
background variables in the second step invalidates this assumption (see Kumbhakar et al., 1991; 
Reifschneider and Stevenson, 1991).  
5    As data limitations make complete coverage of all relevant output and background variables 
unattainable, we must be cautious in equating observed ‘inefficiencies’ with realizable cost savings. 
Nevertheless, even with  incomplete coverage, u and its determinants offer valuable insights into the 
characteristics that affect municipalities’ (in)efficiency.    4
2. Local Government Efficiency in Flemish municipalities 
2.1 Institutional context 
As in most West-European countries, Belgian – and therefore Flemish – municipalities 
have important responsibilities with respect to education, housing, health care, social 
welfare, recreation, infrastructure and the environment (including refuse collection) 
(John, 2001, 36).  Still, while local governments have significant authority in executing 
these tasks, their definition and aims derive from federal and regional legislation.   
Hence, though article 162 of the Belgian Constitution explicitly states that 
municipalities can take initiatives that benefit their inhabitants and are in the communal 
interest, the same article also asserts that municipalities are subject to intervention from 
higher-level governments to prevent violations of the law or harm to the (broader) 
public interest.  This places Belgium firmly in a “Southern-European”, Napoleonic 
tradition where the central (and, in the case of Belgium, regional) government wields 
significant power (John, 2001, 34-39; Moesen, 2005). 
 
This institutional setting is important since it has been frequently argued that decisions 
made by those at the top involve choices among values or goals, whereas decisions 
lower in the organization are largely devoid of such value content (see Simon, 1957; 
March and Simon, 1958).  Hence, in systems that have traditionally been driven by the 
central government (such as Belgium), the work of local governments has much larger 
“factual” (or means-focused) content than “value” (or ends-focused) content.  Local 
government work in Belgium thus can be best described as ‘do-or-die’ and is largely 
devoid of value choices (in contrast to, say, the US, where the value-component of local 
policy decisions is larger).  This generates a situation that is particularly conducive to 
efficiency measurements (as the value-content or neutrality of the inputs and outputs 
then becomes less of an issue). 
 
Importantly, the financial constraints within which Flemish municipalities are expected 
to execute their tasks have over the past decade tightened significantly, often as a 
consequence of regional and federal decisions (VVSG, 2004; Smolders and Goeminne, 
2005; Dexia, 2006).  Given that tax-increases are politically costly (see supra), these 
tightening financial constraints might increase local-level attention to and interest in 
increasing efficiency. While not an exhaustive list, we briefly discuss two (central) 
sources of local government revenues and one expenditure head that were strongly 
affected by recent legislative changes to illustrate the point.   
 
•  First, local governments in Belgium – and Flanders – raise tax revenues 
mainly via surcharges on residents’ regional property and federal income 
tax bills (in 2002, these formed 43% and 39% of local tax revenues, or 22% 
and 20% of total revenues, respectively).  In 1998, however, the Flemish 
regional government extended the exemption system for the regional 
property tax, which significantly lowered regional property tax revenues 
(VVSG, 2004). This reduced the tax base of the local surcharge and thus (in 
part) explains why local property tax revenues declined on average circa 
7.5% over the period 1998-2000.  In 2001, the federal government accepted 
a package of measures reducing personal income tax revenues by over 3 
billion euro (Moesen and Stevens, 2003; Smolders and Goeminne, 2005; 
Dexia, 2006).  The implied reduction in the local income tax base reduced   5
revenues from the local surcharge by roughly 11% (Smolders and 
Goeminne, 2005, 194-5) and was especially constraining in 2005-2006 (i.e. 
the years after the most important changes took effect) (VVSG, 2004; 
Dexia, 2006). 
•  EU directive 96/92 initiated the liberalisation of the European energy 
market.  Following this directive, Flanders fully liberalised its gas and 
electricity markets in July 2003.  This had strong financial repercussions on 
the Flemish municipalities since, up to that point, they received large 
dividends from their participation in (local monopolies organising) 
electricity and gas distribution.  In 2000, these dividends represented on 
average 7.9% of local government revenues, but had reduced 66% by 2005 
(Dexia, 2006, 43).  Still, the drop in revenue was lower since the Belgian 
federal government partly compensated this loss. 
•  Belgian municipalities are responsibility for public safety via the local 
police.  In 2002, the Belgian police services were, however, significantly 
reorganised by the federal government into an entity with two levels: i.e. 
one federal police corps and 196 local police zones.  While the entire police 
force now works under federal regulations (Dexia, 2006), the municipalities 
remain responsible for organising and running the local police zones as well 
as for circa 60% of their funding (plus coverage of any potential financial 
deficit in their police zone) (Goeminne and Smolders, 2005; Dexia, 2006).  
The financial impact of this reorganisation on the municipalities was a hotly 
debated topic and recent studies indicate that municipalities on average saw 
their expenditures on the police force increase by 24.1% in 2002 (Goeminne 
and Smolders, 2005; see also Moesen and Stevens, 2003). 
 
2.2 Description of data and variables 
We utilise data from 300 of the 308 Flemish municipal governments in the year 2000 
(data unavailability precluding inclusion of the remaining eight municipalities).  Local 
public goods provision is measured through five output variables (see Vanden Eeckaut 
et al., 1993; De Borger et al., 1994; De Borger and Kerstens, 1996): (a) the number of 
subsistence grants beneficiaries, (b) the number of students in local primary schools, (c) 
the size of public recreational facilities (in hectare), (d) the total length of municipal 
roads (in km) and (e) the share of municipal waste collected through door-to-door 
collections.  These relate to important social, educational, recreational, infrastructural 
and environmental responsibilities of local governments.
6  More specifically, the 
number of subsistence grants beneficiaries and primary school students proxy the extent 
of social welfare and educational service provision.  The size of public recreational 
facilities indicates the provision of recreational, leisure services.  The length of 
municipal roads proxies the provision of local infrastructure and the share of waste 
collected indicates public environmental and ecological services.  Clearly, none of these 
variables is a direct output measure and they are best seen as crude proxies for the level 
of public goods provision (De Borger et al., 1994; De Borger and Kerstens, 1996; 
Boyne, 2002).  Therefore, as in previous work on local government efficiency, “outputs 
used are rather loosely related to the services delivered by municipal governments” (De 
                                                 
6   They also constitute services municipalities are legally required to provide.  Hence, the output-mix is 
restricted to services municipalities cannot opt out of (reducing worries that differences in observed 
(in)efficiency capture only differences in output-mix).  We thank an anonymous referee for pointing 
this out.   6
Borger and Kerstens, 1996, 153-154).  This, regrettably, reflects the general problem 
with defining and measuring public sector outputs (cf. Levitt and Joyce, 1987; De 
Borger and Kerstens, 1996).
7  
 
Our main input variable (C) equals current expenditures on those issues for which we 
observe government outputs.  As such, we relate spending on a given number of 
services to spending on these same services.  The reason for this choice is that it closely 
relates inputs (i.e. expenditures) to outputs (i.e. public services), thereby reducing 
worries that differences in observed (in)efficiency capture only differences in the 
output-mix.  Alternatively, and as a robustness check, we estimate the model using total 
expenditures.  Obviously, in this case, the municipality’s output-mix choice plays a role 
(since municipalities might spend less on the outputs the analysis captures, and more on 
outputs that we cannot measure due to lack of data). 
 
To measure the effect of exogenous (or non-discretionary) influences (i.e. zi), we 
include a wide range of socio-economic and political variables.  To start with the 
variable central to our analysis, we include the municipality’s ‘type’.  Data regarding 
these types was taken from Dessoy (1998), who derived them by exploiting information 
on more than 100 morphologic and socio-economic variables describing Flemish 
municipalities (e.g. use of soil and buildings, income structure, economic activities, 
demographic structure and external/tourist appeal).  Specifically, he first used factor 
analysis to reduce all this information into seven factors and, in a second step, used 
cluster analysis to determine which municipalities are ‘closest’ to each other in this 
seven-dimensional space (i.e. those for which the values for the seven factors have 
comparable values) (for details, see Dessoy, 1998).  This two step process grouped 
municipalities in ‘agricultural’ (N=62), ‘residential’ (144), ‘industrial’ (65), ‘urbanised’ 
(21) and ‘tourist’ (8) municipalities.  ‘Agricultural’ municipalities are characterised by 
an above-average agricultural sector and below-average demographic situation and 
socio-economic status of their inhabitants; ‘residential’ municipalities exhibit above-
average wealth and demographic growth; ‘industrial’ municipalities combine a highly 
urbanised profile with above-average industrial activities and below-average third-
sector activities; ‘urbanised’ municipalities stand out as highly urbanised and attractive 
to third-sector activities; ‘tourist’ municipalities show extreme levels of tourist appeal 
(and include only sea-side municipalities). 
 
Sampaio de Sousa and Stosic (2005, 177) that the “low efficiency score of some small 
[Brazilian] municipalities can be explained by the fact that they engage in tourism”.  
More generally, this suggests that the municipality’s overall character might affect the 
way it is run.  One possible reason could be that municipalities with, say, large 
agricultural or tourist activities face different constraints than, say, municipalities with a 
predominantly industrial or residential set-up.  Also, they may have differences in needs 
and aspirations due to variations in population density, education level, preference 
structures and so on…  This is likely to affect the decisions made by the local 
government, and (possibly) its technical efficiency.  It is important to note, however, 
that the local governments’ level of technical efficiency over time could affect the 
municipality’s character.  For example, more efficient governments may attract 
                                                 
7   Unfortunately, information on output quality and input prices was not available.  Panel data could 
admittedly help in resolving some of the problems related to these measurement issues.  However, 
time series data were not available for several of our output variables which meant that this issue 
could not be addressed in the present analysis.   7
businesses or richer inhabitants and ultimately become more ‘industrial’ or ‘residential’.  
The latter argument similarly implies the existence of a relation between municipal type 
and efficiency, but one running in the other direction (i.e. from efficiency to type).  To 
assess the link between municipality type and local government technical efficiency, we 
include dummy variables for four of the municipal types distinguished (using urbanised 
municipalities as a reference category).
8   
 
To accurately capture the effect of municipal types and minimize the risk of missing 
variable bias, we control in the vector zi for a number of socio-economic and political 
elements that may affect municipal efficiency.  Firstly, we include the per capita income 
level and the education level of the population (measured as the share of inhabitants 
over age 20 holding a university or college degree) based on the hypothesis that high-
income or highly educated citizens might be “more effective in demanding more 
efficient government” (Knack, 2002, 777).    We also include income inequality 
(measured by the interquartile difference divided by the median income; i.e. (Q3-
Q1)/Median) to assess the effect of income heterogeneity, rather than just the income 
level in the municipality.  Next, we include the unemployment rate.  The effect of this 
variable is more ambiguous as it implies both higher spending on unemployment 
benefits (a ‘cost effect’) and lower demand for public services (which increase with 
income levels) (a ‘preference effect’) (Geys et al., 2008).  We furthermore introduce 
population size (and its squared value) and population density (measured as the number 
of inhabitants per 100 square kilometres) to control for potential (dis)economies of 
scale.  Then, we assess the effect of the large-scale municipal amalgamation operation 
in Belgium in 1976, by incorporating a variable equal to the number of pre-1977 
communities that were united in one municipality in that year.  As inhabitants may still 
identify with their ‘historical’ community within the current municipality (cf. Lago-
Penas, 2004; Geys, 2006b), the ensuing ‘intra-municipality’ struggle may reduce overall 
efficiency.  As a final socio-economic variable, the share of owner-occupiers is 
included.  Local government policies influence housing prices (Oates, 1969; Reback, 
2005).  Hence, homeownership is likely to encourage citizens to insist on efficient 
government behaviour (Green and White, 1997; DiPasquale and Glaeser, 1999).
9 
 
Three further variables control for the overall financial situation of the municipality.  
Firstly, the lagged level of long-term local public debt (measured as a share of total 
municipal revenues) gauges the strain placed by past (investment) decisions on 
municipal finances.  High interest and amortization repayments reduce the level of 
public goods provision possible with a given level of expenditures (making highly 
indebted municipalities appear less efficient in the current period).  Secondly, the lagged 
level of the fiscal surplus (measured as a share of total municipal revenues) assesses the 
idea that bad financial management might be correlated with bad management in other 
                                                 
8    Importantly, this modelling approach does not allow us to establish the direction of the causal 
relationship (rather than simply observe the inter-relation between both variables).  One might argue 
that Instrumental Variables (IV) estimation should be considered in order to address this problem.  
The one-step procedure employed here, however, does not allow for the introduction of instrumental 
variables.  Still, as the two-step approach mentioned above leads to biased inferences (see footnote 4), 
we believe the one-step procedure is nonetheless preferable.  Obviously, no clear uni-directional 
‘causal’ inference can therefore be drawn from the analysis. 
9   Data availability leads us to use 1991 data on the percentage of houses with a known resident that are 
occupied by the owner.  Note that this time-lag mitigates against potential reverse causality problems 
that arise if citizens are more likely to buy (rather than rent) housing accommodation in efficiently 
run municipalities.  We are grateful to Robert Nuscheler for this insight.    8
respects.  Thirdly, the level of general purpose grants awarded to the municipality by 
higher level governments (measured as a share of total municipal revenues) addresses 
the hypothesis that politicians take less care in spending grant monies than in spending 
tax monies (Grossman et al., 1999). 
 
Finally, we introduce the government’s ideological position – defined as the weighed 
average ideological position of all government parties (with weights equal to party seat 
shares in the local government).
10  This builds on the idea that right-wing politicians 
generally more fiercely support the workings of the market, while left-wing politicians 
favour higher government intervention (see Hibbs, 1977; Tavares, 2004).  It is not a 
priori clear, however, how these different preferences would translate into higher (or 
lower) efficiency.  Note also that province dummies are included in all regressions to 
control for potential geographical patterns in the distribution of government efficiency 
(a view more extensively discussed – and supported – in Geys, 2006a and Revelli and 
Tovmo, 2007). 
 
2.3 Empirical Results 
The results of the model are presented in table 1.  As we are mainly interested in the 
relation between local government (in)efficiency and the municipalities’ background (or 
non-discretionary) variables, table 1 only presents the results from the inefficiency part 
of the equation (i.e. equation (3) above:  w z u
I
i i i + + = ∑ =1δ γ ).
11  Moreover, to 
simplify interpretation, we inverse all signs such that positive signs in table 1 indicate 
that the explanatory variable has a positive effect on municipal efficiency (rather than 
inefficiency).  Readers should thus imagine -u (i.e. efficiency) rather than u itself (i.e. 
inefficiency) as the dependent variable in table 1. As discussed above, we provide 
results for two measures of municipal expenditures.   The first, and most important, 
captures spending related to the five output variables in the model (results in columns 
(1) through (3)).  The second equals total municipal spending (columns (4) through (6)).  
The latter results are mainly given for reasons of robustness and to illustrate the 
importance of accurately choosing inputs and outputs.  In either case, three different 
specifications are given.  Columns (1) and (4) present the ‘base-line’ model, while 
columns (2) and (5) and (3) and (6) add population concentration and homeownership 
respectively.   
______________ 
Table 1  
about here 
______________ 
                                                 
10    The data concerning parties’ ideological position are based on a self-placement survey among 
presidents and spokesmen of the parties in the municipalities – asking them to locate their party on a 
scale from 0 (extreme Left) to 10 (extreme Right) – and derive from Deschouwer (1996). 
11   Clearly, this presentational choice implies that the five output variables included in the model do not 
feature directly in the table.  They are obviously used in the cost function equation to determine the 
inefficiency level (i.e. via equation (2) above), but, to keep the size of the table within reasonable 
limits, we do not report the exact results.   9
Starting with the variables central to our analysis, it can be seen from columns (1) 
through (3) that the type of municipality is at best weakly related to local government 
efficiency.  None of the types behaves statistically significantly differently from the 
others.  This suggests comparable performance across municipal types in providing 
‘core’ public services.  The latter finding is reassuring given that different choices in the 
output-mix over and beyond the ‘core’ services the municipalities are required to 
provide thus do not appear to affect the efficiency with which they provide these basic 
services.  In sharp contrast to the results in the first three columns, however, we find 
strong and significant differences between municipal types once we use total spending 
as the primary input measure (see columns (4) through (6)).  More specifically, 
compared to urbanised municipalities, agricultural, residential and industrial 
municipalities are found to perform better, tourist municipalities on average perform 
worse.
12  This difference in results is impressive, and of considerable interest.  Indeed, 
as mentioned above, when using total spending the output-mix of the municipality plays 
a role in the analysis.  Hence, the observed (in)efficiency differences in the last three 
columns probably reflect differences in output-mix rather than ‘real’ variations in 
efficiency, suggesting it is crucial to properly relate inputs to outputs to avoid incorrect 
inferences. 
 
Casting a brief look at the remaining results, we observe that income, income 
inequality, unemployment, education, homeownership, government ideology and the 
number of pre-1976 municipalities do not significantly relate to local government 
(in)efficiency.  Population, on the other hand, does.  Larger municipalities tend be less 
efficient than smaller ones, ceteris paribus.  This confirms the significant diseconomies 
of scale found by Vanden Eeckaut et al. (1993) using 1985 data in a sample of 235 
Belgian municipalities.  Interestingly, introduction of population concentration does not 
affect this result.  Inclusion of this variable (see columns (2) and (5)) indicates that 
stronger concentration of inhabitants is significantly negatively related to efficiency.  
This supports the idea that the costs of public service provision may become more 
pronounced as population concentration rises (e.g. De Borger et al., 1990).   
 
Finally, two of the three financial variables in the model have a significant relation to 
municipal efficiency ratings.  Long-term local public debt is associated with lower 
efficiency.  This suggests that high debt repayments impinge on municipal efficiency, 
even when it relates to provision of core public services.  Moreover, and more 
surprising, we find that higher grants are related to higher efficiency ratings.  This result 
is highly statistically significant and consistent over all our estimations.  A similarly 
confounding result was retrieved for US cities by Grossman et al. (1999) and Australian 
local governments by Worthington (2000).  It is, however, at odds with De Borger et al. 
(1994), who show that Belgian local government efficiency in 1985 is negatively related 
to the level of grants.  One possible way to explain this divergence in results for the 
same country between 1985 and 2000 is that the grant system in Belgium was 
fundamentally changed in the late 1980’s, also becoming a regional rather than federal 
                                                 
12   In line with Sampaio De Sousa and Stosic (2005) for a sample of 4796 Brazilian municipalities, we 
find a consistent negative effect for tourist municipalities, which, importantly, fails to reach 
significance at conventional levels once we control for potential variation in the output-mix (i.e. 
columns (1) through (3)).  Interestingly, their argument – i.e. that inefficiency may derive at least in 
part from underestimation of these municipalities’ population size since “they tend to have a 
significant floating population” (De Sousa and Stosic, 2005, 177) – corresponds to our results.  That 
is, the observed inefficiency of these municipalities in their study may simply be an ‘artefact’ due to 
insufficient control of municipal characteristics (or, as our results suggest, output-mix choices).   10
responsibility.  Possibly, in the new system, transfers are linked with a stricter 
supervision of expenditures (reducing wasteful application of these resources).   
Alternatively, performance financing became more important and our results indicate 
that this shift from welfare financing to performance pay improved local government 
efficiency.  These (highly) tentative explanations would, however, require more careful 
inspection and further research.   
 
3. Conclusion and discussion 
The aim of the current paper was to provide some initial steps to explore the sources of 
government (in)efficiency using data on Flemish municipal governments in the year 
2000.  While not extensively discussed, there is scope for efficiency improvement in 
‘core’ public services in Flemish municipalities.  A negativist interpretation of this 
would be that local governments suffer from considerable waste of resources or rent 
extraction by politicians.  Still, given the existing – and mounting – pressures on local 
public finances in Flanders, there may be a more positive interpretation.  In fact, at least 
part of these fiscal quandries can be confronted by making more efficient use of current 
resources.  Given the inherent unpopularity of tax increases (Niskanen, 1979; Vermeir 
and Heyndels, 2006), local politicians may see this as a viable – and electorally more 
rewarding (or, at least, less intricate) – alternative. 
 
Regarding the sources of variation in efficiency across the Flemish municipalities, we 
observe that previously obtained results largely hold: a) larger and more densely 
populated municipalities tend be less efficient (indicating that a significant part of the 
observed inefficiencies is driven by scale inefficiencies), b) socio-economic 
characteristics of the population (such as income, income inequality, unemployment, 
education and homeownership) have little relation to local government (in)efficiency, 
and c) grants have a strong and consistent relation to efficiency.  Importantly, in 
Flanders, grants from higher level governments positively affect efficiency.  This is 
confounding as one would expect that such resources would be used less efficiently 
(given that they are perceived to be less costly to the local community).  While this 
finding may indicate that higher-level governments’ grants in Flanders are linked to 
strict supervision on expenditures (reducing wasteful application of these resources), 
this is – at present – at best a tentative explanation requiring further analysis.  A new 
result of the present study is that local government efficiency on ‘core’ public services 
is not related to municipal typology (i.e. agricultural, residential, industrial, touristic or 
urbanised).  In fact, our results suggest that such differences, when observed, appear to 
derive mainly from the differences in the output-mix chosen by such municipalities.  
After controlling for output-mix differences (by restraining the analysis to a given set of 
outputs and their related spending levels), these differences disappear.  This points to 
the crucial importance of adequately specifying inputs and outputs in the analysis to 
avoid erroneous inferences. 
 
Given the importance of (local) government efficiency in the current political and 
economic landscape, the present exploration into the causes of variation in efficiency 
across municipalities should not be the end-point.  Indeed, our dataset precluded an 
analysis into the causal nature of the processes observed (which would be a crucial issue 
to address in future research analysing time-series cross-section data). Also, it is worth 
delving further into what mechanisms trigger and/or explain the observed relationships: 
politics, resources, differences in tasks or workload?   11
References 
Aigner, D.J., C.A.K. Lovell, and P. Schmidt. “Formulation and Estimation of Stochastic 
Frontier Production Function Models.” Journal of Econometrics 6 (1977): 21–37. 
Battese G.E., and T.J. Coelli. “A Model for Technical Efficiency Effects in a Stochastic 
Frontier Production Function with Panel Data.” Empirical Economics 20 (1995) 325-
32. 
Bauer, P.W. “A Technique for Estimating a cost system that allows for Inefficiency.” 
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Working Paper (1984) nr. 8704. 
Boyne, G.A. “Concepts and Indicators of Local Authority Performance: An Evaluation 
of the Statutory Frameworks in England and Wales.” Public Money and Management 
22(2) (2002) 17-24. 
Coelli T.J. “A Guide to FRONTIER version 4.1: A Computer Program for Stochastic 
Frontier Production and Cost Function Estimation.” CEPA Working papers No. 7/96 
(1996). 
De Borger, B., K. Kerstens, W. Moesen, and J. Vanneste. “Efficiency and Equity in 
Block Grant Design: Simulating Some Alternatives for Flemish Municipalities.” 
Cahiers Economiques de Bruxelles 128 (1990): 399-421. 
De Borger, B., K. Kerstens, W. Moesen, and J. Vanneste. “Explaining Differences in 
Productive Efficiency: An Application to Belgian Municipalities.” Public Choice 80 
(1994): 339-58. 
De Borger, B., and K. Kerstens. “Cost Efficiency of Belgian Local Governments: A 
Comparative Analysis of FDH, DEA and Econometric Approaches.” Regional 
Science and Urban Economics 26 (1996): 145-70. 
De Borger, B., and K. Kerstens. “What is Known about Municipal Efficiency? The 
Belgian Case and Beyond.” In Public Provision and Performance: Contributions 
from Efficiency and Productivity Measurement, edited by J. Blank, 299-330. 
Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2000. 
De Prins, D., L. Simar, and H. Tulkens. “Measuring Labour Efficiency in Post Offices.” 
In The Performance of Public Enterprises: Concepts and Measurement, edited by M. 
Marchand, P. Pestieau and H. Tulkens, 243-67. North Holland: Amsterdam, 1984. 
Deschouwer K. “Nationale Partijen en Gemeenteraadsverkiezingen.” In De dorpsstraat 
is de wetstraat niet, edited by J. Buelens and K. Deschouwer, 13-25. VUBPress: 
Brussels, 1996. 
Dessoy, A. “Sociaal-Economische Typologie van de Gemeenten.” Tijdschrift van het 
Gemeentekrediet 205(3) (1998): 17-43. 
Dexia.  De Financiële Uitdagingen voor de Nieuwe Gemeentebesturen. Dexia Bank, 
Brussel, 2006. 
DiPasquale, D.,  E.L. Glaeser. “Incentives and Social Capital: Are Homeowners better 
Citizens?” Journal of Urban Economics 45 (1999): 354-84. 
Dunn, W.N. Public Policy Analysis: An Introduction. Pearson Prentice Hall, New 
Jersey, 2004.   12
Faria, A., P. Fenn, and A. Bruce. “Production Technologies and Technical Efficiency: 
Evidence from Portuguese Manufacturing Industry.” Applied Economics 37(9) 
(2005): 1037-46. 
Farrell, M. “The Measurement of Productive Efficiency.” Journal of the Royal 
Statistical Society, Series A: General 120 (1957): 253-81. 
Geys, B. “Looking across Borders: A Test of Spatial Policy Interdependence using 
Local Government Efficiency Ratings.” Journal of Urban Economics 60 (3) (2006a): 
443-62.  
Geys, B. “District Magnitude, Social Heterogeneity and Local Party System 
Fragmentation.” Party Politics 12(2) (2006b): 281-97. 
Geys, B., F. Heinemann, and A. Kalb. “Voter Involvement, Fiscal Autonomy and 
Public Sector Efficiency: Evidence from German Municipalities.”  ZEW Discussion 
Paper 08-024 (2008). 
Geys, B. and J. Vermeir. “Taxation and Presidential Approval: Separate Effects from 
Tax Burden and Tax Structure Turbulence?” Public Choice 135(3-4) (2008), 301-
317. 
Goeminne, S., and C. Smolders. “Impact van de Politiehervorming op de lokale 
financiën.” Publiek Domein 2(1) (2005): 41-8. 
Green, R.K., M.J. White. “Measuring the Benefits of Homeowning: Effects on 
Children.” Journal of Urban Economics 41 (1997): 441-61. 
Grossman, P.J., P. Mavros, and R.W. Wassmer. “Public Sector Technical Inefficiency 
in Large US Cities.” Journal of Urban Economics 46 (1999): 278-299. 
Hibbs, D. “Political Parties and Macro-Economic Policy.” American Political Science 
Review 71 (1977): 1467-87. 
Hindriks, J., and F. Gerard. “Le Palmares des Villes et Communes en Wallonie: Une 
Approche en Termes d’Efficacité.” Regards Économiques 35 (2005): 1-16. 
Jondrow, J., C.A.K. Lovell I. Materov, and P. Schmidt. “On the Estimation of Technical 
Inefficiency in the Stochastic Frontier Production Function Model.” Journal of 
Econometrics 19 (1982): 233-38.  
Knack, S. “Social Capital and the Quality of Government: Evidence from the States.” 
American Journal of Political Science 46(4) (2002): 772-85. 
Kumbhakar, S.C., S. Gosh, and J.T. McGuckin. “A Generalized Production Frontier 
Approach for estimating Determinants of Inefficiency in US Dairy Firms” Journal of 
Business and Economic Statistics 9 (1991): 249-286. 
Lago Penas, I. “Cleavages and Thresholds: The Political Consequences of Electoral 
Laws in the Spanish Autonomous Communities 1980-2000.” Electoral Studies 23 
(2004): 23-43. 
Latruffe, L., K. Balcombe, S. Davidova, and K. Zaawalinska. “Determinants of 
Technical Efficiency of Crop and Livestock Farms in Poland.” Applied Economics 
36(12) (2004): 1255-63. 
Levitt, M., and M. Joyce. The Growth and Efficiency of Public Spending. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1987.   13
Lindblad, M.R., “Performance Measurement in Local Economic Development.” Urban 
Affairs Review 41(5) (2006): 646-72. 
Lovell, C.A.K. “Production Frontiers and Productive Efficiency.” In The Measurement 
of Productive Efficiency: Techniques and Applications, edited by H. Fried, C.A.K. 
Lovell and S. Schmidt, 3-67. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993. 
Meeusen, W., and J. van den Broeck. “Efficiency Estimation from Cobb-Douglas 
Production Functions with Composed Error.” International Economic Review 18 (2) 
(1977): 435–44. 
Méon, P.-G., and L. Weill. “Does Better Governance foster Efficiency? An Aggregate 
Frontier Analysis.” Economics of Governance 6(1) (2005): 75-90. 
Moesen, W. Gemeentelijk Goed en Rekenschappelijk Bestuur. Leuven: Centrum voor 
Economische Studiën, 2005. 
Moesen, W., and T. Stevens. “Een Projectie voor de Gemeentefinanciën: Samenstelling 
en Samenspel.” Documentatieblad van FOD Financien 63(3) (2003): 113-51. 
Musgrave, R.M. The Theory of Public Finance, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959. 
Niskanen, W.A. “Bureaucrats and Politicians.” Journal of Law and Economics 18 
(1979): 617-43. 
Oates, W.E. “The Effect of Property Taxes and Local Public Spending on Property 
Values: An Empirical Study of Tax Capitalization and the Tiebout Hypothesis.” 
Journal of Political Economy 77(6) (1969): 957-71. 
Oates, W.E. Fiscal Federalism, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972. 
Oates, W.E. “An Essay on Fiscal Federalism.” Journal of Economic Literature, 37 
(1999): 1120-49. 
Pitt, M.M. and L.F. Lee. “Measurement and Sources of Technical Inefficiency in the 
Indonesian Weaving Industry.” Journal of Development Economics 9 (1981): 43-64. 
Reback, R. “Housing Prices and the Provision of Local Public Services: Capitalization 
under School Choice Programs.” Journal of Urban Economics 57 (2005): 275-301. 
Reifschneider, D. and R. Stevenson. “Systematic Departures from the Frontier: A 
Framework for the Analysis of Firm Inefficiency.” International Economic Review 
32 (1991): 715-723. 
Revelli, F., and P. Tovmo. “Revealed Yardstick Competition: Local Government 
Efficiency Patterns in Norway.” Journal of Urban Economics 62 (2007): 121-134. 
Sampaio De Sousa, M.C., and B. Stosic. “Technical Efficiency of the Brazilian 
Municipalities: Correcting Non-Parametric Frontier Measurements for Outliers.” 
Journal of Productivity Analysis 24 (2005): 157-81. 
Smolders, C., and S. Goeminne. De Impact van Bovenbestuurlijke Beslissingen op de 
Lokale Fiscaliteit in Vlaanderen. SBOV Gent, Gent, 2005. 
Stevens P.A. “Accounting for Background Variables in Stochastic Frontier Analysis.” 
NIESR Discussion Paper, No. 239 (2004). 
Tavares, J. “Does Right or Left matter? Cabinets, Credibility and Fiscal Adjustments.” 
Journal of Public Economics 88 (2004): 2447-68.   14
Tulkens, H. “On FDH Efficiency Analysis: Some Methodological Issues and 
Applications to Retail Banking, Courts and Urban Transit.” Journal of Productivity 
Analysis 4(1-2) (1993): 183-210. 
Tullock, G. “Federalism: Problems of Scale.” Public Choice 6 (1969): 19-29. 
Vanden Eeckhaut, P., H. Tulkens, and M. Jamar. “Cost Efficiency in Belgian 
Municipalities.”  In The Measurement of Productive Efficiency: Techniques and 
Applications, edited by H. Fried, C.A.K. Lovell and S. Schmidt, 300-334. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1993. 
Vermeir, J., and B. Heyndels. Tax Policy and Yardstick Voting in Flemish Municipal 
Elections.” Applied Economics 38 (19) (2006): 2285-98. 
VVSG. Gemeentefiscaliteit in het Verdomhoekje: Analyse, Bedreigingen en remedies. 
VVSG vzw, Brussel, 2004. 
Worthington, A.C. “Performance Indicators and Efficiency Measurement in Public 
Libraries.” Australian Economic Review 32 (1) (1999): 31-42. 
Worthington, A.C. “Cost Efficiency in Australian Local Government: A Comparative 
Analysis of Mathematical Programming and Econometric Approaches.” Financial 
Accountability and Management 16 (3) (2000): 201-23.   15
Table 1: Sources of efficiency in Flemish municipalities. 
Efficiency rating using  
Spending on Retained Outputs 
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- -0.0002  *** 
(-2.52) 
- -  -0.0003  *** 
(-4.61) 
- 
Homeowners -  -  0.001 
(0.41) 
























































































































































Note:  N = 300; robust t-statistics in brackets; *** denotes significance at 1% level, ** at 5% and * at 
10%; LL represent the loglikelihood of the model LR one-sided error assesses the null hypothesis 
of no inefficiencies against the alternative hypothesis that inefficiencies are present. 
 
a Urbanised municipalities are the comparison group (designation based on Dessoy, 
1998). 
 